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Foreword 
This Technical Note, entitled Strengthening Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue in 
the Republic of Korea, presents the results of a technical assessment by the ILO of key 
aspects of the industrial relations system in Korea. 
 
In April, 2003, the Tripartite Commission of the Republic of Korea (KTC) invited the 
ILO to undertake a diagnosis of Korean industrial relations in both the private and public 
sectors. In response to this request, a three-week fact-finding mission took place in 
September, 2003. The members of the fact-finding team were Mr. Lucio Baccaro, Research 
and Policy Development Specialist, IFP/DIALOGUE, Mr. Chang-Hee Lee, Industrial 
Relations and Social Dialogue Specialist, ILO Subregional Office, Bangkok, 
Mr. Sang-Hoon Lim, Korea Labor Institute, and Mr. Ee-hwan Jung, Seoul National 
University of Technology. During this fact-finding mission, extensive discussions and 
interviews were conducted with government representatives, workers and employers’ 
organizations, as well as other persons knowledgeable and working in the field of industrial 
relations in Korea.   
 
A draft of this Technical Note was presented to the Korean tripartite constituents at the 
KTC-ILO International Workshop on Collective Bargaining Structure and Social Dialogue 
in Korea held in Seoul on 28 October, 2003. During this workshop, the proposals and 
options presented in the draft were extensively discussed and commented upon by 
representatives of the Korean Ministry of Labour and the social partners, as well as by 
representatives of various research institutes, universities and prominent NGOs. The 
following common themes and additional insights emerged from these discussions: 
 
• all the parties acknowledged that there are major problems with the functioning 
of the industrial relations system in Korea, even though it was pointed out by 
some participants that these problems might be exaggerated by parts of the 
media and in the perception of some of the public and other commentators;   
 
• the parties discussed the possibility that the Korean industrial relations system 
could combine industrial unions with a relatively decentralized structure of 
bargaining. In this regard, it was emphasized that there is a need to distinguish 
between industrial unionism and industry-level bargaining. One is independent 
from the other. Yet the two issues are often mixed-up in the policy debate in 
Korea; 
 
• it was generally accepted that the current system of decentralized bargaining at 
the level of the enterprise would remain key in the near future. Nevertheless, 
there seemed to be interest among the parties (government, worker and 
employer representatives) to explore further the option of greater coordination 
in the bargaining structure; 
 
• there appeared to be acceptance of the need to have clear articulation between 
different levels to avoid overlap and duplication of bargaining costs in those 
sectors where industry bargaining has emerged. It was agreed that further 
discussion was required as to the specifics of how to generate greater bargaining 
coordination and articulation in the Korean context; 
 
 
 vi 
 
• in relation to the role of the KTC, there was explicit support from the tripartite 
actors that it should play an important role, particularly in relation to promoting 
national level social dialogue and that, therefore, the Government should 
strengthen its capacities to fulfil this role more effectively; 
 
• all parties, particularly the employers’ and workers’ representatives, welcomed 
proposals to strengthen industrial relations services and the overall industrial 
relations infrastructure; 
 
• the Ministry of Labour confirmed the government’s commitment to bring the 
legislative framework in Korea into line with internationally-accepted standards 
in the industrial relations field. 
 
IFP/DIALOGUE, in collaboration with the ILO Subregional Office, Bangkok, is 
prepared to continue to work with the Korean government and social partners to support 
their process of industrial relations reform particularly in relation to the following two areas 
in which the ILO’s technical expertise and comparative knowledge may be helpful:  
 
1) the exploration of different options for collective bargaining coordination or 
articulation, and the structure of union representation at the enterprise level;  
 
2) the provision of technical assistance to reform and enhance the industrial 
relations infrastructure, specifically in the area of dispute prevention and 
resolution, and the development of other industrial relations-related advisory 
services. 
 
I would like to record my appreciation to the ILO authors of this Technical Note, 
Mr. Lucio Baccaro, Research and Policy Development Specialist, IFP/DIALOGUE and 
Mr. Chang-Hee Lee, Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue Specialist, ILO Subregional 
Office, Bangkok. I would also like to thank the Tripartite Commission of the Republic of 
Korea for its joint-collaboration in this exercise, the Korea Labor Institute for its 
sponsorship of the workshop, and the Korean tripartite constituents and other experts who 
gave so generously of their time and willingly shared their expertise and experience with 
the ILO. 
 
 
 
 
November 2003 Patricia O’Donovan 
 Director 
 InFocus Programme on Social Dialogue, 
 Labour Law and Labour Administration 
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Overview of current trends in industrial relations 
and social dialogue 
Issues related to freedom of association 
 
Considerations of the industrial relations context should bear in mind the discrepancies 
between several current legislative provisions and some internationally recognized trade 
union rights. In this respect, it should be recalled that the Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA) has been examining complaints against the Government of the Republic 
of Korea for the past ten years.  The pending case (No. 1865) was first submitted to the 
CFA in 1996 and stems from complaints emanating from three national trade unions and 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This case was last examined in June 
2003 with recommendations to amend the legislation on the following points: guarantees 
for the right to organize public servants; legalization of trade union pluralism at the 
enterprise level; repeal of the ban on payment of wages to full-time union officials; removal 
of penal sanctions for the non-notification of third-parties intervening in collective 
bargaining; repeal of prohibition on union membership and office for dismissed and 
unemployed workers; assurance that compulsory arbitration is only used for essential 
services in the strict sense of the term or for public servants exercising authority in the 
name of the State; amendment of the Penal Code on obstruction of business to ensure that 
workers are not effectively denied their right to have recourse to legitimate industrial 
action. As regards the frequent use of detention and imprisonment for a number of workers 
engaged in strike action, the CFA has encouraged the Government to give full application 
to its recently-announced policy to establish a practice of investigation without detention 
for trade unionists who violate current labour laws, unless they commit an act of violence. 
All of these points continue to be reviewed by the CFA and an ILO advisory mission is 
scheduled for the end of this year to assist the Government further in implementing the 
CFA’s recommendations. 
 
Korean industrial relations (IR) are in flux. All three actors in the Republic of Korea 
(henceforth, Korea), government, employers’ and workers’ organizations, agree that there 
are fundamental problems with the current structure and functioning of the IR system. They 
disagree, however, on the root causes and possible remedies.   
 
Worker organizations are dissatisfied with the status quo. They feel that their legitimate 
rights have been largely denied, that their voices have been ignored, and that they had to 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs associated with economic adjustment after the 
financial crisis of 1997. Accordingly, trade unions feel that they have to defend their 
members’ rights and interests by strengthening their bargaining position through the 
creation of industrial unions. Consistent with this view, they have altered their 
organizational structures and become more concentrated in the last few years. In 2002, 
26.6 per cent of union members – KCTU affiliated unions 42.9 per cent and FKTU 
affiliated unions 15.6 per cent – were affiliated with industrial unions, a significant increase 
from the pre-crisis level. This is a sign that a growing number of union members are being 
represented by unions whose scope of representation is beyond the enterprise level.   
 
Employers and their associations are not satisfied with the current situation either. For 
them, there are two key problems with Korean industrial relations: unreasonable union 
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demands and violations of existing labour laws by unions, particularly in the course of 
industrial action. Moreover, the employers complain that work rules are overly inflexible in 
the Korean business environment, particularly in regard to layoffs, and that this threatens 
their ability to cope with competition, especially from low-cost countries (like China). 
Employers oppose collective bargaining above the firm level, which they regard as a 
limitation on their managerial prerogatives. Industry unions, they argue, are responsible for 
undue radicalization of industrial relations at the enterprise level.   
 
In spite of efforts which led to some improvements, successive Governments have 
failed to create the institutional infrastructure needed for sound industrial relations. 
Restrictions on freedom of association and collective bargaining rights unduly delayed the 
institutionalization of labour and management relations. Arising from this, the legitimacy 
of the law was seriously eroded and the effectiveness of law enforcement in the industrial 
relations sphere reduced. There is serious concern, particularly on the part of Government, 
that IR problems may negatively affect the country’s economic performance, as well as its 
attractiveness for foreign investors.  
 
The clearest sign that something is not working properly in the Korean IR system is the 
unusually high number of strikes. Quantitative indicators, especially the number of days 
lost through strikes, show that Korea has become more conflictual than traditionally 
conflictual countries like Italy and France, and much more conflictual than Japan, Germany 
or Sweden. Also, strikes in Korea are often said to be associated with unusual tension and 
violence. 
 
Labour market dualisms are on the rise. The wage gap between large and small/medium 
enterprises is growing. In 1997, the total wage of regular workers in firms with more than 
300 employees was 32 per cent higher that that of regular workers in firms with less than 
300 employees. In 2002, the gap had increased to 48 per cent. While the unemployment 
rate is back to normal proportions, that is, 3.4 per cent in 2002 (it had reached 7.6 per cent 
in 1998), it is considerably higher among young people. Growing labour market dualism 
has spurred a debate on the possibly negative consequences of existing IR practices for 
labour market performance. This issue cannot be properly addressed without more careful 
examination of the links between union and bargaining structure, and labour market 
performance. 
 
The IR actors have trouble representing the entire gamut of interests and identities in 
the world of work. Union representation is low in a comparative perspective. In 2001, it 
was about 12 per cent. Also, union membership is dominated by workers in large 
companies. In fact, the unionization rate is 76 per cent in manufacturing companies with 
more than 15,000 workers, 5.4 per cent in companies with 30-99 employees, and only 0.9 
per cent in companies with 10-29 employees.1 Workers in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, as well as irregular (atypical) workers, are, for the most part, outside of the 
unions’ current constituency. 
 
 
1 Jong-Il You and Ju-Ho Lee, “Economic and Social Consequences of Globalization: The Case of South 
Korea.” New York: Center for Economic Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 17, February 2000: p.16. 
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Employers’ associations also face challenges. Peak-level employer associations have 
limited success in shaping the bargaining strategies of their affiliates. Sectoral- or branch-
level employer associations are, in most cases, non-existent. While the employers’ 
community in Korea is highly critical of the current state of industrial relations, there is a 
widely shared perception that employers lack the capacity to contribute effectively to a 
transformation of the country’s poor industrial relations situation.  
 
Government’s commitment to social dialogue is sometimes faltering and social partners 
doubt whether Government has a political commitment to social dialogue and adequate 
policy measures in place to sustain the dialogue. Moreover, industrial relations support 
services (e.g. data collection, basic research and fact-finding, mediation and conciliation 
services) are not always up to the task. 
 
Many of the trends described above (e.g. growing union centralization, industrial 
conflict, labour market dualism) have been apparent for a number of years. The crisis of 
1997 has accelerated them. This crisis was a shock for a country in which workers had 
grown accustomed to employment-security and ever-growing increases in living standards. 
Due to the bitter experience of the crisis, to which large companies responded by engaging 
in massive lay-offs, many workers no longer trust their employers. The lesson they learnt 
was that the best way to defend themselves was through collective action, rather than 
dialogue. The 1997 crisis led to a breakdown of the old, implicit workplace social contract 
between management and workers, but a new social contract, be it explicit or implicit, has 
not yet emerged.  
 
The crisis appears to have created new dynamics in both the public and private sectors. 
Driven by privatization, restructuring and a growing sense of insecurity, public sector 
industrial relations are likely to be destabilized unless appropriate measures are taken. In 
the private sector, a gradual shift away from enterprise-based unions and towards industrial 
unionism is taking place. Its ultimate aim appears to be that of bringing about industry-
level bargaining. To cope with these challenges, the tripartite actors need to carefully 
review their strategies and approaches if they want to build a sound industrial relations 
system. 
 
The remainder of this technical note contains an analysis of the Korean IR system and 
suggestions on how to improve it. Some preliminary clarifications may be required on a 
number of key issues.  
 
First, it is worth noting that social dialogue can flourish under various IR arrangements. 
More precisely, successful social dialogue does not presuppose necessarily the existence of 
macro-level social corporatism. The recent experience of Ireland, Italy and other countries 
suggests that even peak-level social dialogue can safely rest on a wider array of 
organizational structures than was previously believed. In these countries, highly successful 
social pacts (especially in Ireland) have been negotiated in recent years. Yet the countries’ 
IR systems were much more decentralized than in traditional neo-corporatist models. Also, 
the experience of Japan (until the 1980s) suggests that coordinated enterprise bargaining 
can lead to similar labour market and macroeconomic outcomes as in more centralized 
systems.   
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Second, it is important to uncouple two issues that are often mixed up in the policy 
debate, industrial unionism and industry-level (or even branch-level) collective bargaining. 
The former does not necessarily require the latter. As illustrated by various advanced 
countries (e.g. the US, the UK, Ireland), enterprise-level bargaining may take place 
between company managers and the local chapters of nationally-established union 
organizations, organized along sectoral (or other) lines. As for Korea, the possibility that 
the Korean IR system may one day combine a relatively decentralized bargaining structure 
with union organizations structured along industry lines should not be ruled out.  
 
Third, it needs to be emphasized that coordination and centralization of collective 
bargaining are two different things. During our fact-finding mission, we often heard the 
argument that decentralization generates sub-optimal labour market outcomes, and that, 
therefore, the collective bargaining structure needs to be centralized. It should be noted, 
however, that even decentralized systems may be remarkably coordinated. 
 
Finally, this report is based upon observation of a limited number of enterprises and 
sectors – mostly those in which IR are not working well or new challenges are emerging. 
We are aware that there are many enterprises and sectors where labour-management 
relations are functioning properly. In this report, we focus on the most problematic aspects 
of industrial relations in Korea – those that cause a great degree of concern for the tripartite 
actors.  
Renewing the architecture of collective 
bargaining and representation 
The shift to industrial unions and industry-wide 
bargaining 
Korean trade unions seem to be intent on bringing about a transformation from 
enterprise to industrial unionism. This transformation has its origins in the solidaristic 
orientation of the Korean trade union movement, at least since the emergence of 
independent trade unions in 1987. Recently, however, this solidaristic orientation has met 
with a powerful catalyst, namely the financial crisis of 1997. 
 
The massive scale of lay-offs during the crisis led workers and their trade union leaders 
in some enterprises to realize that, left on their own, enterprise unions would be unable to 
cope with large-scale restructuring. In addition, particularly unions in small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) found it increasingly difficult to deal with management’s unfair labour 
practices because of their weak bargaining position. In short, some enterprise unions 
realized that they needed to give up some autonomy in bargaining in exchange for support 
from a much broader constituency than they themselves would be able to muster.  The 
experience of the employment crisis, unusually high levels of conflict and distrust at the 
enterprise level (at least in some sectors) pushed workers and their trade union leaders to 
seek support in the form of industrial unionism, so as to create a countervailing force vis-à-
vis individual employers by enhancing their ability to mobilize workers at the industry 
level, and to keep their jobs by achieving greater bargaining power. The strategy did not 
necessarily aim to secure industry-wide working conditions beyond the enterprise level. 
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 There appears to be a consensus among IR actors and researchers, including the 
advocates of industrial unionism, that the current trend towards industrial unionism will not 
necessarily lead to industry-wide determination of wages and other key benefits, due to the 
differences in working conditions among the enterprises concerned.  
 
It is however equally true that there is a high degree of anxiety and concern about the 
potentially negative industrial relations outcomes caused by uncoordinated bargaining 
structures and industrial action at multiple levels of the economy. Against the backdrop of 
unusually conflictual labour-management relations at the workplace level, this form of 
industry-level bargaining has led to some undesirable bargaining behaviour at both industry 
and enterprise levels - particularly in the metal sector. This includes overlapping bargaining 
levels, de facto enterprise bargaining disguised as industry-wide bargaining, and multiple 
strikes at all levels. 
 
However, industry-level bargaining has not led to problems in all sectors. In the 
banking sector, for example, its introduction has been relatively smooth. According to 
some bankers, sectoral negotiations were beneficial for firms as several important issues, 
which would normally have been dealt with at the enterprise level, were settled at the 
industry level instead. In other words, an efficient division of labour between the sector- 
and the enterprise-level seems to have emerged in the banking sector. Bargaining costs 
were not duplicated.  
 
The relatively positive outcomes in the banking sector appear to be linked to a host of 
factors including previous experience of sectoral bargaining before 1980; good labour-
management relations at the enterprise level; the employers’ pragmatic acceptance of the 
union’s demand for sectoral bargaining; the formation of a sectoral organization of 
employers and, a relatively homogeneous workforce and working conditions in the sector, 
which created a sense of community of interests among employers and workers.  
 
In contrast with the banking sector, the move towards industry bargaining in the metal 
sector was more controversial. The situation of the metal sector is considerably different. 
Enterprise-level labour-management relations are generally adversarial; there is little 
previous experience of sectoral bargaining; the employers’ capacity to act collectively is 
very weak; and finally, there are considerable differences in wages and working conditions 
within the sector.  
 
The scope of the bargaining unit in the metal sector was largely determined by the 
organizational structure of the relevant union, the Korea Metal Workers Union. As a result, 
the bargaining unit covered very diverse groups of enterprises: the first and second tier of 
automobile parts suppliers, small scale engineering firms, steel makers, shipbuilders and 
even pharmaceutical firms. Unions in large auto assemblers and shipbuilders continued to 
stay outside of the industrial union structure. These conditions tend to make it more 
difficult for employers to associate. A very weak form of coordination among a limited 
number of employers emerged in response to union pressure. This may be taken as a first 
sign that, even on the employer side, the organizational structures needed for sectoral 
bargaining may be emerging. This coordinating unit had, however, very little authority over 
individual employers in the bargaining unit.  
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These conditions explain the particular features of the ‘industry-level bargaining’ in the 
metal sector. The absence of employers’ associations and the limited influence of the 
employers’ negotiation team over individual employers contributed to a turbulent 
bargaining process at industry level, as the union attempted to negotiate again with 
individual employers who were reluctant to accept the terms agreed between the union and 
the employers’ negotiation team. The inability of the industrial union to control its local 
branches, combined with the weakness of the employers in the bargaining unit and the 
absence of agreed rules on bargaining and industrial actions at industry level, created the 
host of problems we described earlier.  
Industrial unions and industry-wide bargaining: two 
separate issues 
The above situation clearly shows that for proper industry-wide bargaining, there 
should not only be industrial unions but also employers’ associations at industry level: it 
takes two to tango. Careful examination of the historical evidence shows that centralized 
bargaining materializes and reproduces itself over time when it serves the interests of 
employers as well. In the countries with well-developed industrial bargaining practices, at 
least a significant portion of the employers clearly perceives the advantages of dealing with 
unions above the firm level. These advantages are of different kinds: centralized bargaining 
homogenizes wages and working conditions and prevents “unfair” competition; it reduces 
conflict and bargaining costs by moving the centre of negotiations out of the firm; it 
contributes to rein in unions or employers whose bargaining behaviour has negative 
consequences (a.k.a. as “externalities”) for other firms; finally, centralized bargaining, 
combined with other institutions in the sphere of, e.g. vocational training, produces a 
variety of collective goods (for example, a well-qualified and motivated workforce) which 
would be undersupplied by other bargaining regimes. 
 
It is to be noted that the countries where industry-level bargaining is most solid and 
resilient, say Sweden or Germany (at least until a few years ago) are also the countries in 
which employers, not as individual but as collective entities, are strongest. Where 
individual employers are strong but employer associations are weak, i.e. in the US or in the 
UK, collective bargaining is decentralized. In this regard, it is important to note that 
industrial unions and industry bargaining do not necessarily rise and fall together. One can 
have industrial unions and a more decentralized structure of bargaining simultaneously.   
Coordinated bargaining 
In spite of the recent shift towards industrial unionism in some sectors, the enterprise 
continues to be the most important level of industrial relations in Korea. A majority of 
unions are still enterprise unions and key working conditions are negotiated mostly at the 
enterprise level even in the sectors where unions successfully transformed themselves into 
industrial unions. Even the advocates of industrial unionism admit that the current 
experiment with industrial bargaining would not lead to industry-wide determination of key 
working conditions such as wages and other benefits (at least in the near future). At the 
same time, it is equally true that the new industrial unionism will create different conditions 
for the evolution of industrial relations in significant parts of the unionized sectors.  
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In the following paragraphs, we will explore a range of feasible options for an optimal 
bargaining process, considering the prevailing enterprise bargaining system in Korea while 
paying due attention to newly emerging trends towards industrial unionism and bargaining. 
In so doing, we will draw lessons from other countries with a view to assisting the social 
partners to develop their own approaches. The ILO strongly believes that the choice of a 
particular bargaining structure should be made by trade unions and employer associations. 
In view of the considerable externalities associated with collective bargaining (e.g. on 
economic competitiveness, unemployment, inflation, etc.), the State may participate in the 
process. It should not, however, impose or favour specific types or levels of bargaining. 
The imposition of specific types or levels of bargaining is counterproductive from the point 
of view of industrial relations performance. In fact, the IR system is not stable unless it is 
based on rules which both parties recognize as their own and voluntarily comply with. The 
following paragraphs intend to facilitate the policy discussion among the social partners by 
illustrating a number of options, and therefore should not be seen as a statement favouring a 
specific mode or structure of collective bargaining in Korea. Ultimately, the choice will and 
should be made by the social partners themselves, as they see fit. 
 
In a decentralized bargaining system, coordination among different bargaining units is 
key to achieving desirable economic and labour market outcomes. Without it, two things 
are likely to happen. Bargaining settlements in companies with greater ability to pay than 
others are likely to influence settlements in the rest of the economy, with negative 
consequences for employment and competitiveness. Also, a phenomenon of “leapfrogging” 
is likely to emerge, with unions mobilizing to demand a bit more than others have already 
obtained.  
 
Synchronicity of negotiations and pattern bargaining prove to be powerful mechanisms 
of coordination, as demonstrated by the Japanese and German experience. The most 
powerful mechanisms are, however, inside trade unions and employer associations.  
Coordinated bargaining is only viable when there are strong associations. This indicates 
that industrial unions and sectoral employers’ associations can be powerful facilitating 
elements for coordinated bargaining.  
 
It is important for bargaining coordination that industry- and confederal-union 
structures be able to exercise control over their decentralized affiliates and ensure that these 
abide by nationally-agreed bargaining policies. This does not mean that they should impose 
particular bargaining outcomes on their affiliates. Simply, the majority rule should be 
applied. In other words, bargaining policies should be democratically adopted at higher-
level conventions, in which union locals should all have a chance to influence collective 
outcomes. Once a decision is taken by majority rule, all affiliates (even those that disagree 
with the outcomes) should live with it. In spite of the declared goal of industrial unionism 
and bargaining, however, it appears that the industrial unions are much weaker than 
enterprise unions in terms of both human and financial resources. Also, it is not clear how 
much real influence sectoral federations exert at national conventions, compared with the 
delegations of enterprise unions. This indicates that if unions want to live up to their 
declared goal of industrial unionism, the industrial federations should be given greater 
resources and power.  
 
Strong employer associations are at least as important for coordinated bargaining as 
strong unions. In fact, bargaining is coordinated only if employer associations can prevent 
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companies in favourable market conditions giving in too easily to union demands. It is 
worth mentioning in this regard that the coordinated collective bargaining system in Japan 
relies heavily on employer coordination.2  It is also interesting to note that employer 
solidarity in countries like Sweden and Germany is built on a strategic use of the lock-out 
weapon proportional to the industry-wide strike weapon of the industry unions. In several 
cases, this requires coordination among different firms to be effective and, therefore, 
strengthens employers’ organizations. The coordinating capacities of Korean employers are 
relatively weak and seem to have declined in recent years.3  Regardless of its formal 
position on the formation of sectoral employers’ associations, the KEF needs to increase its 
capacity to influence affiliate companies. In particular, the KEF needs to help employers, 
including emerging employers’ groups at sectoral and regional level, to develop their 
industrial relations capacities and strategies. 
 
Coordinated bargaining at decentralized level, through synchronicity of negotiations 
and pattern bargaining, seems to be closest to the current IR environment in Korea. Its 
effectiveness is predicated on the actors’ (unions and employers) capacity to exercise 
control over company-level bargaining settlements. To increase coordination, company-
level bargaining could be joint (or “diagonal”), in the sense that national unions could be 
involved in company-level negotiations. Similarly, national employer associations could 
assist individual employers in collective bargaining.4  
 
This coordinated bargaining at the decentralized level is not just compatible with 
bargaining arrangements at industry or branch level, but one can reinforce the other. For 
example, it is perfectly feasible, and even probable in the Korean context that, “light” 
sectoral bargaining co-exists with “heavier” bargaining at the level of the firm. For this and 
other “articulated” bargaining structures to function, there needs to be an explicit division 
of labour among bargaining levels. In other words, bargaining levels should not overlap 
and what is negotiated at one level should not be renegotiated at other levels. Issues of 
common concern for companies could be devolved to the industry or branch level, while 
pay bargaining and other enterprise-specific issues are decentralized. 
 
A variant of this option involves a role for upper-level bargaining in wage negotiations 
as well. In this case, the industry level adapts nominal wages to cost of living increases. Its 
role is that of establishing uniform wage floors. Bargaining at the company level 
redistributes firm-specific productivity increases. This kind of bargaining architecture was 
introduced in Italy in 1993. In Italy, wage payments at the level of the firm are (at least in 
 
2 The Japanese industrial relations system, which Korean employers were eager to introduce, was not 
simply the result of the sum of cooperative labour-management relations within individual firms, but also the 
outcome of the concerted efforts of employers through collective networks established during the formative 
years of Japanese industrial relations. 
3 During our fact-finding mission, we were told that an informal but effective coordinating forum (known 
as top 30 chaebols) recently ceased to operate due to the split-up of some chaebols into separate business 
entities and the (highly-publicized) collapse of others. 
4 In this regard, it is worth noting that, in Ireland, wage recommendations are first negotiated by the peak 
actors at the national level (including Government), and then jointly issued prior to the bargaining round at 
the enterprise level. 
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theory) tied to indicators of productivity and profitability to be jointly negotiated by the 
parties. Like the former one, this bargaining structure requires considerable capacities for 
intra-organizational coordination on the part of the actors.  
 
Whatever bargaining structure emerges, the key to sound industrial relations is the 
capacity of social partners for self-governance at all levels. The legacy of the 
developmental state has resulted in the under-development of labour-management self-
governance at supra-enterprise level as well as at the enterprise level, until very recently. 
Due to this legacy, trade unions and employer(s) tend to turn too often to the Government 
whenever something goes wrong. In this regard, the shift towards industrial unionism and 
the emerging employers’ networks at regional and industry level could be seen as a 
significant development, as it offers potential ground for labour-management self-
governance beyond the firm level. Both the social partners and Government should 
carefully nurture the spirit of self-governance at intermediate levels. It is worth noting that 
in European countries where industry or branch bargaining is the norm, there are 
sophisticated procedures and rules jointly developed by the parties with a view to 
regulating their business through bipartite agreement without government intervention.  
 
We noted above that the choice of a particular bargaining structure is the business of 
trade unions and employers (and their associations), and that the Government should not try 
to impose or favour specific types or levels of bargaining. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
current labour laws and legal authorities tend to give a privileged status to enterprise 
bargaining and enterprise unionism. This may indicate a need to review and adjust labour 
laws (including the interpretation and application of the laws by the courts and the National 
Labour Relations Commission) with a view to providing a proper legal framework under 
which collective bargaining at relevant levels can be conducted in an orderly and sound 
manner.  
 
Given the economic impact of industrial action at sectoral level, the functions and 
services of the National Labour Relations Commission (NLRC) should be reviewed to 
include specialized mediation services and the development of acceptable criteria and 
procedures for dispute settlement.  
Industrial relations at the enterprise level 
A view is sometimes expressed that industry-wide bargaining would improve 
enterprise-level IR by moving some of the broader and more contentious issues to a higher 
level. It is certainly true that under certain conditions, the sound practice of collective 
bargaining and social dialogue at industry level can produce collective goods as well as 
reduce bargaining costs and conflicts at the firm level. However, this assumption needs to 
be considered carefully because the experiences of the banking and the metal sectors 
referred to above appear to suggest something different. Where enterprise-level IR are 
good, industry-level IR are also good, and, vice versa, when enterprise-level industrial 
relations are bad to begin with, IR at industry level are very likely to be conflictual and 
turbulent. This implies that no matter what industrial relations arrangements prevail at the 
industry level, the task of improving industrial relations at the enterprise level remains key.  
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We are aware that many Korean enterprises enjoy good labour-management relations 
based upon mutual respect and participation. However, a considerable number of 
enterprises suffer from a relatively high degree of industrial conflict. In those enterprises, 
there is neither acceptance of the other party’s legitimacy, nor mutual trust. According to 
workers and union leaders, there is a lack of transparency and an authoritarian and 
unilateral style of management, while for management the main problem is the 
unreasonable behaviour of unions.  
 
The trade union leaders we interviewed argued that informal factional strife within 
enterprise unions tended to compromise the official decision-making process and the 
democratic leadership of the unions, damaging the unions’ ability to act responsibly so as 
to serve the best interests of workers. This tells us that there is a need for serious reflection 
on the issue of internal union governance and efforts to improve it by union leaders at all 
levels, if the trade union movement in Korea wants to represent and promote the real and 
genuine interests of workers as well as their direct members.  
 
There is evidence that, in a considerable number of companies, management relies upon 
unfair labour practices and very hierarchical modes of management – particularly in small 
and medium-sized firms. We were told that poor corporate governance and insufficient 
decision-making power at the factory level tend to compromise the management’s ability to 
take decisions on industrial relations issues. This suggests that there is a need to improve 
management transparency while making efforts to develop and maintain proper 
information-sharing procedures and communication with employees.  
 
In this regard, we would like to emphasize the crucial role of employers. There is a 
need for employers to make collective efforts – as well as individual efforts – to develop 
and implement HR/IR policies5 aimed at improving labour-management relations within 
individual enterprises, while enhancing their collective capacity to deal with industrial 
relations issues at the industry level in cases where industrial bargaining is underway. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the KEF, with the strong support of professional CEOs, initiates 
major nation-wide efforts to develop and spread sound IR and HR policies tailored to the 
needs of Korean companies. Also, there is a need to strengthen the KEF’s capacity to 
provide professional industrial relations advisory services to its member companies.   
 
The absence of proactive industrial relations services appears to be one of the weak 
links in the Korean industrial relations architecture. The NLRC has so far been limited to 
dispute settlement through a compulsory conciliation system. There is no system of 
preventive mediation/conciliation or active industrial relations advisory services, which are 
found in many developed countries. In the United States, for example, the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) provides extensive industrial relations services 
such as diagnoses of labour-management relations, pre-bargaining brainstorming services, 
evaluation of the bargaining process and outcomes. Such services can be provided by 
 
5 There is evidence that Korean companies have failed to establish their own style of HR and IR policy. 
The Korean business community seems to have shifted from its early efforts to copy Japanese management to 
copying the American-style HR model. In this regard, it is to be noted that the collective efforts of Japanese 
managers through Nikkeiren were instrumental in developing, spreading and therefore establishing the once 
much-praised Japanese IR and HR system. 
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forming a partnership between the NLRC and KLEI, together with the KLI, if necessary. It 
is probable that many IR problems at the enterprise level – particularly small and medium-
sized firms – could be resolved by effective mediation and advisory services. The industrial 
relations services should be properly funded and equipped with professional IR 
practitioners who can develop and implement customer-oriented programmes. The services 
should be directed not only to individual firms, but also to social partners’ organizations at 
national, regional and industrial levels. Social partner participation in the design and 
delivery of these services would increase their effectiveness.  
Tripartite social dialogue at branch level: Sector 
Councils 
So far our focus has been exclusively on bipartite industrial relations, namely collective 
bargaining at the enterprise and industry level. The recent proposal by the KTC to establish 
Sector Councils as tripartite social dialogue fora at branch level may have implications for 
industrial relations. Sector Councils can make a meaningful contribution to improving IR 
and enhancing competitiveness in the sectors concerned by providing fora where social 
partners can exchange views with one another and consult with Government on broad 
policy issues affecting the sector.  A number of factors may need to be considered when 
assessing the desirability and feasibility of establishing such Councils in particular sectors 
including the perceived need for them among the social partners in the sector and whether 
or not there are social partner organizations with the capacity to participate in the process. 
 
If Sector Councils are to be established, attention should be paid to providing incentives 
to the social partners to encourage their participation, as one of the desired effects is to 
channel the social partners’ short-term approaches into more long-term oriented dialogue. 
Care also needs to be taken to introduce a proper division of labour between functions, 
processes and the agenda of bipartite industrial relations and tripartite dialogue at 
branch/industry level.  
 
In general, Sector Councils could improve the overall industrial relations climate and 
contribute to address broad policy issues particularly in the public sector, the health sector, 
the second tier of the financial sector and the public transport sector (buses and taxis), 
where government public policy has considerable impact and there is a perceived need for 
such Councils by the social partners.  
Revamping national-level social dialogue 
The creation of the Korea Tripartite Commission in 1998 was a historic event in Korea 
because, previously, there was no institutionalized social dialogue structure beyond the 
firm level. Created in the midst of the financial crisis, the KTC played a crucial role in 
mobilizing tripartite consensus on restructuring measures, emergency employment policies, 
and expansion of the unemployment insurance system, which helped the country weather 
the crisis. This was the most significant step towards social dialogue at the national level. 
 
However, the working of the KTC has never been smooth, not least due to the 
unfortunate fact that the KTC had to deal with the painful restructuring of the economy in a 
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crisis situation which involved massive job losses. Unsurprisingly, this invited criticism 
from trade unions who perceived it as a tool to legitimize “neo-liberal policies.” Also, there 
is a perception among trade unionists that their voices were not heard properly in the 
dialogue, and that the Government used the KTC instrumentally to rally societal consensus 
for policies that had been designed elsewhere. Certainly it was not helpful to the KTC when 
the Government did not implement the elements of the social pact extending the rights of 
workers, while swiftly implementing painful measures for workers. Currently, one of the 
national trade union centres – the KCTU – does not participate in the work of the KTC. 
 
It is to be noted that there can be various modes of social dialogue at national level 
other than institutionalized tripartite social dialogue. For example, it is well known that 
bipartite social dialogue at national level plays a crucial role in the Netherlands in parallel 
with tripartite social dialogue. At the same time, it is also true that there can be direct 
employer-government dialogue as well as direct union-government dialogue. In general, 
social dialogue at national level can be successful in so far as tripartite actors are capable of 
articulating their policies through internal, democratic consultation with their constituency 
and have organizational capacity to deliver the agreement. However, it appears that the 
Government has failed to pass this test when it defaulted on the agreement on granting 
union membership entitlement to unemployed workers, just like the unions failed to pass 
the test of persuasive communication with their constituency. There is little evidence that 
the employers have been able to articulate proactive strategies and policies through internal 
consultation with their constituency. It needs to be emphasized that government failure to 
deliver on its commitments would be a serious blow for tripartite social dialogue in any 
country, not just in Korea. 
 
Therefore, it is crucial that the Government send a clear signal of renewed commitment, 
if it wants social dialogue to take off again. To do so, the Government should be able to 
produce a coherent industrial relations strategy and concrete policy measures through inter-
ministerial consultations. Also, Government should ensure that if agreements are 
successfully negotiated through the KTC process, the agreed policies are implemented in a 
timely manner.  
 
At the same time, the KTC needs to be equipped with an appropriate level of human 
and financial resources. In particular, the KTC needs to have a greater degree of autonomy 
in recruiting appropriately qualified staff, who can offer not only expert advice on the 
dialogue agenda, but also play the role of active interlocutor between the KTC and the 
social partners. Also, a number of the representatives of social partners’ organizations 
expressed the view that the operation of the KTC should be less bureaucratic, and needs to 
be more agile and flexible to meet the demands of its customers, i.e. the social partners.  
 
During our fact-finding mission, a suggestion was made by a number of interviewees 
that a partnership between the KTC and KLI would be desirable, as the KTC can benefit 
greatly from the research capacities of the KLI, which would help redefine the dialogue 
agenda in a way to encourage long-term deliberation of the key policy issues rather than 
focusing on the short-term interests of the social partners. 
 
One peculiar feature of representation in the KTC process is the participation (with 
voting rights) of so-called “public interest representatives.” These representatives are 
selected mostly from labour-related academic associations. If the social partners consider it 
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appropriate, representatives of other relevant groups and associations could be included, 
particularly when the dialogue is about wider economic and social issues.  
The role of Government in industrial relations 
The role of the Government in IR will assume greater importance, not only as the third 
party to social dialogue, but also as the most important employer in the country. The 
Government needs to develop a strategic plan for improvement and reform of IR. In this 
regard, it is highly desirable that Government develops and implements such a strategic 
plan through effective and flexible coordination/cooperation among the IR-related agencies 
such as the KTC, Central/Provincial Labour Relations Commission(s), Korea Labor 
Institute and Korea Labour Education Institute with a view to establishing an industrial 
relations infrastructure in the country. Investment in the IR policy field includes not only 
investment to establish industrial relations services, but also investment in creating a 
critical mass of professional IR practitioners as well as developing inter-ministerial IR 
policy coordination mechanisms.  
 
The country’s industrial relations service capacity appears to be under-developed – 
particularly when we consider the country’s level of economic development and the 
magnitude of its industrial relations problems. Also, industrial relations services are often 
delivered with little regard to the effective needs of the social partners. 
 
The National Labour Relations Commission, as a tripartite dispute settlement 
institution, needs to be strengthened. While it is encouraging that the success rate of 
conciliation has recently improved, the functions of the Commission need to be greatly 
expanded. In this regard, government plans to introduce preventive conciliation/mediation 
services, while gradually moving towards a voluntary conciliation system and away from 
the current compulsory conciliation system, are welcome.  
 
Providing high quality voluntary conciliation services is not an easy task. The system 
should be trusted by the social partners because of its professionalism and the quality of its 
services, not because of legal obligations. This implies that the NLRC needs to recruit a 
sufficient number of full-time professional mediators/conciliators. Special attention should 
be devoted to the training and experience of the conciliators/mediators, as they should have 
experience and knowledge of the dynamics of collective bargaining and disputes. Union 
and employers’ members of the NLRC also need to be trained in the basic skills of 
conciliation and mediation. In this regard, the operational aspects of the FMCS in the US or 
ACAS in the UK could provide some lessons for the upgrading of the NLRC.  
 
Creating better synergy between different agencies dealing with industrial relations will 
be instrumental in enhancing the overall capacity of the Government to improve industrial 
relations at all levels. As mentioned above, Government needs to enhance its industrial 
relations capacity by developing and implementing a strategic plan for improving IR, and 
by establishing effective and flexible coordination among IR-related government agencies 
such as the MOL, KTC, KLI, NLRC and KLEI.  
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Public sector collective bargaining 
Public sector bargaining has additional complications to private sector bargaining and 
requires specific solutions. In the private sector, the mechanism of market competition 
(domestic or international) sooner or later forces actors to take into account the 
consequences that negotiated settlements may have for the economic viability of the firm.  
If this is seriously endangered, workers lose their jobs. Therefore, in the private sector (if 
market competition is not muted by unfair trade practices among firms), collective 
bargaining has an in-built stabilization mechanism. In Korea the situation is more 
complicated. In fact, large assemblers often enjoy remarkable degrees of market power 
over their smaller suppliers, which are economically dependent on them. Even in these 
circumstances, large assemblers have to watch out for foreign competition. 
 
This stabilization mechanism is absent from the public sector. As a result, pluralist 
industrial relations may fail in the public sector. Here public agencies and government 
companies may not have adequate incentives to manage union demands. In many cases, 
these are monopoly providers of services. Cost increases can be transferred to prices. Also, 
personnel decisions like hiring and firing are the result of administrative decisions and are 
not closely linked with company performance. In these circumstances, collective 
bargaining can generate negative externalities for the general public. These remarks are not 
purely theoretical. In Italy, for example, the years after the transition (in 1983) from 
administrative regulation to public sector collective bargaining were characterized by wage 
militancy, which soon spilled over to the private sector as well.   
 
In most advanced countries, public sector workers are among the most highly unionized 
workers. When full rights to freedom of association are granted to public servants in Korea, 
the public sector may come to play an important, and perhaps even the dominant role, in 
Korean IR. It is, therefore, worthwhile reflecting on what impact this may have for the 
long-term viability of the system. 
 
At the moment, public sector industrial relations are quite tense in some industries, e.g. 
railroads. This seems related to two variables, the presence of KCTU unions, which are 
generally more militant than FKTU unions, and the use (or threat to use) of layoffs as a 
mechanism for cutting personnel, as opposed to other, less abrasive tools like honorary 
retirements or attrition. In some cases, e.g. postal services, operations generate substantial 
profits. Both unions and management would like to redistribute these surpluses to the 
workforce. They argue that this would greatly enhance the quality of relationships among 
them. This is probably true. However, this kind of deal should be discouraged. Because 
profits in sectors not exposed to competition may be the result of rents, it is very important 
for collective bargaining in the public sector to have institutional mechanisms that prevent 
collusion among the parties. 
 
In various countries, public sector managers are not entirely free to set wage and 
working conditions through collective bargaining.  Public sector bargaining takes place 
under the “shadow of hierarchy.” Basic parameters are set to ensure that the outcomes of 
collective bargaining are compatible with sound economic management. For example, in 
various countries the Government issues wage guidelines. The importance of wage 
guidelines is easily understood if one considers that the outcomes of public sector 
bargaining have a tendency to spill over to the private sector. Wage comparisons, or 
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competition for scarce labour, may force private sector companies to match public sector 
increases. In Korea, the Ministry of Budget and Planning issues wage recommendations. 
These are generally respected because adherence to them plays a role in management 
performance appraisal.   
 
In some cases, the shadow of hierarchy may be insufficient. In fact, the literature on the 
political cycle has shown that politicians may increase public expenditures to increase their 
chances of re-election. To obviate these problems, some countries have delegated the task 
of public sector bargaining to autonomous administrative units, which are (at least in 
theory) better insulated from short-term pressures. This is an option that Korean actors may 
want to consider. Another solution would be to broaden the process to involve some of the 
outsiders. For example, a variety of stakeholders could be consulted over the most 
appropriate wage guidelines for the public sector. These stakeholders could include, for 
example, private sector employers and representatives of the broader public.   
Broadening interest representation 
As mentioned above, trade unions’ move towards industrial unionism has two goals: 
that of building stronger links between workers; and that of strengthening the bargaining 
power of unions in small and medium-sized firms.  According to trade unionists at the 
national level, enterprise unions are structurally unable to internalize the interests of 
irregular workers, who represent at present 52 per cent of the Korean workforce. The 
enterprise unions’ constituency is, in fact, composed of regular workers.  For these, 
irregular workers are a safety valve in the sense that they provide the flexibility that 
companies need to stay economically viable. Also, most union members are employed in 
large firms. By moving to an industrial structure, trade unions hope to be able to expand 
their representation to cover irregular workers and workers in small firms. This would be a 
positive development not only for unions, but also for the country as a whole, because 
union policies would, on the whole, become more representative of the universe of worker 
interests than is presently the case, and, therefore, be more attentive to labour market 
inequalities. At present, there is a perception that union policies reflect the interests of only 
one constituency, that of regular workers in large companies. 
 
In Korea, collective bargaining agreements only apply to unionized workers and 
organized employers. Yet, the outcomes of collective bargaining have consequences for 
non-organized workers and employers as well. For example, given the particular structure 
of the Korean economy, in which large firms enjoy considerable market power over their 
suppliers – and can shift onto them the costs of their adversarial industrial relations (for 
example by cutting the prices they pay for particular components) – workers and employers 
in small firms may be paying the price for this in some of the large companies, through 
greater insecurity, lower wages and lower profit margins. In other words, the current 
system of representation and collective bargaining may be contributing to growing labour 
market segmentation. 
 
To obviate these problems, interest representation needs to more closely approximate 
the universe of interests at stake. The organization of irregular workers as well as of 
workers in small firms should be encouraged. Similarly, small firms should be organized. 
Also, and perhaps more importantly, these categories of workers and firms should have 
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equal capacity to influence the policies of interest associations as other types of workers 
and firms.   
 
The issue of broader representation is often associated in the Korean public debate with 
the issue of multiple unions. Beginning in 2006, multiple unions will be allowed at the 
enterprise level. This is creating a great deal of anxiety, as it is feared that multiple unions 
will exacerbate union militancy. Yet this legal change, which brings the Korean system into 
greater compliance with international labour standards, is an opportunity, not a threat. In 
fact, it could be used to reform, and broaden, company unions. The experience of several 
countries around the world shows that there are several ways in which the principle of 
union pluralism can be reconciled with fair and equitable representation of all categories of 
workers, as well as sound industrial relations.  
 
Institutional solutions vary. For example, one may draw inspiration from the US model, 
and recognize as exclusive bargaining agent only the union that garners the majority of 
votes in workplace elections. This union would have a duty to represent fairly and 
equitably all workers in a given workplace. Also, electoral procedures should be in place to 
allow workers to shift to another union if they are dissatisfied. What is key to this proposal 
is that company unions are elected by (and accountable to) all workers on the payroll (for 
example, all those with a minimum seniority of six months), not just regular workers. The 
process of union recognition may take different shapes. For example, it could be based on 
membership cards check-off rather than elections. If a particular union can show that it 
organizes more than 50 per cent of workers (including irregular workers) in a particular 
unit, that union is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent. 
 
An alternative solution would be that multiple unions form a single bargaining 
delegation.  Still another solution would be that different unions, representing different 
types of workers, negotiate with management on a one-to-one basis. Both models can be 
found in countries like the UK, Ireland and Italy. In Italy, unions negotiate jointly in most 
cases.  In some cases, however, they sign separate agreements. The particular rules of union 
representation at the enterprise level may be a matter for a procedural agreement between 
management and unions to be negotiated at the national level.   
 
These innovations should provide incentives for unions to broaden their basis of 
representation. As a result, union policies should become more reflective of the general 
interests of workers, not just of particular segments. In a democratic union, in fact, policies 
reflect the preferences of the median worker in the constituency. If the median worker 
changes (because the union constituency becomes broader), union policies are likely to 
change as well. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The Korean IR system is at a crossroads. The old way of managing labour-management 
relations, based on enterprise unions and enterprise-level collective bargaining, no longer 
appears to work, but a new system has not yet emerged. IR problems have generated a 
widespread sense of crisis in the country. Yet, it is important to realize that other countries, 
now regarded as efficient IR systems (e.g. Sweden), have experienced similar situations in 
the past. In many of these countries, the IR climate improved markedly when unions and 
employers realized that they needed to come to terms with a new reality, that of strong 
unions and strong employer associations, and, consequently, jointly redesigned the 
collective bargaining system and the system of interest representation. A decisive step in 
the direction of solving many of Korea’s IR problems would be made if all the social 
partners were to negotiate among themselves a procedural agreement. This agreement 
would establish a mutually acceptable agenda for bargaining at different levels, rules 
regulating union representation at the enterprise level, non-overlapping clauses in collective 
bargaining, the timing of negotiations, procedural issues pertaining to industrial conflict, 
the use of mediation and conciliation procedures, and other issues. Similar to other 
countries, this basic agreement could become the stepping-stone for renewed social 
dialogue at the national level. The ILO is prepared to work with the social partners to 
explore with them different architectures of collective bargaining and representation. 
 
Government should act quickly and decisively to signal to the parties that a new era has 
started, and that IR actors now need to find their own solutions to commonly perceived 
problems within the framework of democratic and pluralistic IR. Failure to do so gives 
actors the wrong kind of incentives and unduly prolongs the transition phase. In this regard, 
bringing the legal framework into line with internationally-recognized labour standards, 
particularly in relation to freedom of association and collective bargaining, could play a key 
role in moving the IR system in this direction. 
 
Improving enterprise-level IR is key to improving IR in the country as a whole. This is 
mainly the social partners’ task. However, Government can facilitate the process by 
providing training in progressive IR/HR policies for company and plant managers, and by 
favouring the diffusion of best practices. Also, because the fear of losing one’s job due to 
lay-offs makes relations between workers and managers more difficult than they would 
otherwise be, enterprise-level IR could be indirectly improved by introducing a social 
safety net and active labour market policies for workers.  
 
Government should strengthen both the political and the technical profile of the KTC, 
as the key institution for national-level social dialogue. In particular, the KTC needs greater 
financial and human resources to fulfil basic data gathering and fact-finding tasks. 
Oftentimes, industrial conflict begins from disagreement on basic facts and figures, as well 
as analysis. Clearly, there is a need for an authoritative source of information in the labour 
and social domain. This may involve a closer relationship between the KTC and some of 
the excellent, government-sponsored research institutions in the Republic of Korea. Also, it 
would be helpful if the KTC’s training services were strengthened. These should be 
targeted to developing the social partners’ capacities for policy design and implementation 
in various domains. 
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The dispute resolution system, and in general, the IR service infrastructure needs to be 
upgraded if the country wants to have more harmonious industrial relations. These 
institutions have not received the attention they deserve. Particular emphasis should be 
given to the urgent need to recruit a sufficient number of full-time professional 
mediators/conciliators from among experienced private sector IR/HR managers and union 
negotiators, rather than retired civil servants. These IR practitioners should be sufficiently 
trained in the art of mediation and conciliation as mediation requires very specialized skills 
and knowledge as well as experiences. The ILO is willing to assist with the reform and 
upgrading of the dispute settlement machinery and with the design of the appropriate 
training programmes. 
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Annex 1  
Preliminary conclusions and recommendations 
Some conclusions and recommendations by 
Patricia O’Donovan, Director, IFP/DIALOGUE, presented 
at the ILO-KTC Workshop, Seoul, 28 October, 2003 
The programme suggests that in this session I should present to you some 
comprehensive suggestions. It seems to me that it would be premature to do so as it is clear 
that this workshop was the beginning of a process of discussion, sharing of knowledge and 
exploration of ideas. This will continue and no doubt comprehensive suggestions will 
emerge from your own reflections and the ILO is of course ready to continue to contribute 
to this process. Nevertheless, I would like to draw some preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations and also indicate to you the areas where I believe that there is scope for 
continuing our collaboration. 
 
I think that this was a very productive workshop and this has been borne out by the 
excellent reports back from both of the discussion groups.   Over the course of the day, and 
thanks to many interesting contributions from the tripartite partners in Korea, we have 
examined in some detail various options for reforming industrial relations and social 
dialogue in Korea.  As I stated in my opening remarks this morning, the goal of this 
workshop is not to come up with solutions, or prescribe particular plans of action, but 
rather to thrash out ideas for possible future development. 
 
Let me summarize what I have detected as common themes and additional insights 
from today’s presentations and discussions. 
 
All the parties acknowledge that there are major problems with the functioning of the 
industrial relations system in Korea even though it was pointed out by some participants 
that these problems may be exaggerated by parts of the media and in the perception of 
some of the public and other commentators.  It is generally accepted that the current system 
of decentralized bargaining at the level of the enterprise will remain key. Nevertheless, 
there seems to be interest among the parties (unions, employers and government) to explore 
further the option of greater coordination in the bargaining structure.  Where industry level 
bargaining is emerging, there appears to be acceptance of the need to have clear articulation 
between different levels to avoid overlap and duplication of bargaining costs. But this 
discussion has just started and has not gone deep enough into the details of what bargaining 
coordination would mean in the Korean context. This is what the parties in Korea now need 
to work on.  Exactly what kind of coordination would be desirable and how would it be 
achieved? In our Draft Technical Note we have made some concrete suggestions on how to 
increase the degree of coordination.  We would like to emphasize at this point that, if this is 
a road that the social partners would like to travel, there are issues of self-governance and 
capacity to be addressed by the actors themselves.  The first step on this road could be the 
initiation of discussions on a basic procedural agreement between employers’ and workers’ 
organizations on the key rules of collective bargaining and representation. 
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Another important point on which some consensus seems to have emerged pertains to 
public sector developments.  In the medium- and long-run, it is clear that industrial 
relations in the public sector will pose their own problems that will need specific solutions, 
possibly different from private sector industrial relations.  One of the important points that 
came out from this morning’s discussion was the need to prepare for these challenges and, 
specifically, the need for education and training for those that will have to undertake 
collective bargaining on behalf of public sector agencies and companies. 
  
One point on which many speakers and commentators agreed this morning is the need 
for a better industrial relations infrastructure.  This point was explicitly acknowledged by 
the representative of the Ministry of Labour, who referred to the need to enhance the 
capacity and role of the Labour Relations Commission.  Detailed recommendations in this 
regard can be found in both the ILO’s Draft Technical Note and in the Diagnosis on 
Collective Bargaining Structure and Social Dialogue in Korea prepared by the Korean 
experts.   
  
Several commentators underlined the key role played by the KTC in the Korean 
industrial relations context.  Aside from bipartite dialogue and collective bargaining, there 
seems to be general acceptance that tripartite social dialogue can be very important for this 
country and that the government needs to strengthen the KTC.  
 
Another positive outcome of today’s discussion was the reiteration of the government’s 
commitment to bring Korea into line with internationally-accepted standards in the 
industrial relations field.  As we stated repeatedly both in the Draft Technical Note and in 
today’s presentations, this commitment is very important not just in its own right, but also 
for the broader significance it might have in reorienting Korean industrial relations and 
social dialogue and in providing incentives for the social partners to invest in mutually 
agreed solutions.   
 
The question of wider interest representation was the subject of a number of comments.  
On the one hand, an interesting remark was made that industrial relations are embedded in 
broader social relations and that the actors to the industrial relations system need to invest 
in persuading the public that their actions and choices are justified and acceptable from a 
broader public interest perspective.  On the other hand, a cautionary note on the desirability 
of involving NGOs in social dialogue structures was sounded.   
 
The Chairperson of this morning’s session, the president of the KLI, made an important 
remark on the urgent need for the social partners to realize that Korea needs fundamental 
change in the area of industrial relations.  Like in other countries, Korea is at a turning 
point and the opportunity should be grasped by all the actors to renegotiate the social 
contract.   
 
At this point, let me signal to you some of the areas where the ILO can continue to 
support your industrial relations reform process: 
 
The exploration of different options for collective bargaining coordination or 
articulation, and the structure of union representation at the enterprise level.  In this 
context, we can continue to make our technical expertise available. 
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The provision of technical assistance to reform and enhance the indusrial relations 
infrastructure, specifically in the area of dispute prevention and resolution, and the 
development of other industrial relations-related advisory services. 
 
Finally, from an ILO perspective, as gender equality is a main part of our Decent Work 
agenda, it would be remiss of me not to raise with you the question of the representation of 
women, not just in this forum, but in the wider industrial relations arena.  The greater 
involvement of women, both at the enterprise level and at the national level, does not just 
have an impact on the content of the collective bargaining agenda, but also on the approach 
and culture of collective bargaining, often bringing a more consensus-based and problem-
solving approach.  In my view, building a modern industrial relations system in Korea must 
ensure that this gender dimension is explicitly addressed. 
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Annex 2  
Workshop programme 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective Bargaining Structure and 
Social Dialogue in Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tuesday, October 28, 2003 
Grand Ballroom, Grand Hilton, Seoul, Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizers: 
Korea Tripartite Commission 
International Labour Organization 
 
Sponsor: 
Korea Labor Institute 
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PROGRAMME 
 
 
09:30-10:00 Registration 
 
10:00-10:25 Session I: Opening  
Opening Address: Mr. Keum-soo Kim, Chairman, KTC  
Keynote Speech: Ms Patricia O'Donovan, Director, InFocus Programme on 
Social Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration, ILO 
 
10:30-12:30 Session II: Presentation of Joint Diagnosis Results 
Chaired by Dr. Won-duck Lee, President, KLI  
 
Subject 1 (10:30 - 10:50): 
"Diagnosis on Collective Bargaining Structure and Social Dialogue in Korea" 
Dr. Ee-hwan Jung, Professor of Seoul National University of Technology 
 
Subject 2 (10:50 - 11:10): 
"Strengthening Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue in the Republic of 
Korea"  
Mr. Lucio Baccaro, Research and Policy Development Specialist, 
InFocus Programme on Social Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour 
Administration, ILO 
 
11:10-12:30 Designated Discussion 
 
12:30-13:30 Lunch hosted by President of KLI 
 
13:30-17:30 Session III: Group Discussion 
 
‘Group 1’: Chaired by Dr. Lee Seon, Vice-Chairman, KTC 
Discussion Topic (13:30-13:45): "Collective Bargaining Structure and Social 
Dialogue in Korea : Private Sector"  
Dr. Chang-Hee Lee, Industrial Relations Specialist, ILO Subregional Office, 
Bangkok 
 
13:45-15:00 Designated Discussion 
 
15:00-15:15 Coffee Break 
 
15:15-17:30 Group Discussion 
 
‘Group 2’: Chaired by Dr. Dae-hwan Kim, Professor of Inha University  
Discusion Topic (13:30-13:45): "Collective Bargaining Structure and Social 
Dialogue in Korea : Public Sector"  
Dr. Sang-Hoon Lim, Research Fellow, Korea Labor Institute 
 
13:45-15:00 Designated Discussion 
15:00-15:15 Coffee Break 
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15:15-17:30 Group Discussion  
 
17:30-17:50 Break 
 
17:50-18:00 Reporting on Discussion Results in Group I 
 
18:00-18:10 Reporting on Discussion Results in Group II 
 
18:10-18:30 Comprehensive Suggestion  
Ms. Patricia O'Donovan, Director, InFocus Programme on Social Dialogue, 
Labour Law and Labour Administration, ILO 
 
18:30-19:50 Dinner 
Congratulatory Speeches  
Representatives of Labor, Management and Government 
 
19:50-20:00 Closing Remarks 
Mr. Keum-Soo Kim, Chairman of Korea Tripartite Commission 
 
20:00  Closing of Conference 
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Annex 3 
List of participants 
Government 
Mr. Kil-Sang Park, Vice-Minister, Ministry of Labor (MOL) 
Mr. Min-Ki Noh, Director-General of Labour Relations Policy Bureau, MOL 
Mr. Young-Soon Kwon, Director, Industrial Relations Policy Department, MOL 
Mr. Hwa-Jin Park, Director, Trade Union Department, MOL 
Mr. Dae-Joong Lee, Deputy-Director, International Cooperation Department, MOL 
Mr. Jong-Lip Byun, Director, Industrial Innovation Department, 
Ministry of Industry and Natural Resources 
Mr. Hoon-Taek Suh, Director, Railroad Policy Department, 
Ministry of Construction and Transport 
Mr. Byung-Sun Song, Director, Fiscal Reform Department, Ministry of Planning and Budget 
Mr. Sung-Joo Kang, Director, Administration Bureau, 
Ministry of Information and Communication 
Mr. Paeng-Jung Kwang, Director, Labour Policy Bureau, Korean Railroad Authority 
Mr. Jong-Cheol Park, Secretary-General, Central Labour Relations Commission 
Mr. Sung-Hee Lee, Labor Policy Advisor to the President 
Employers 
Mr. Nam-Hong Cho, Standing Vice-Chairman, Korea Employers’ Federation (KEF) 
Mr. Dong-Eung Lee, Executive Director, KEF 
Mr. Yong-Woo Nam, Director, IR Policy Team, KEF 
Mr. Hyung-Joon Lee, Director, Legal Department, KEF 
Mr. Seong-Soo Choi, Vice-Director, Department of Labour and Welfare, 
Federation of Korea Industry 
Mr. Moo Joen, Director, Business environment department, 
Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Mr. Young-Ki Kim, Vice-President for HR, LG electronics corporation 
Mr. Young-Ho Kim, Chairman of Changwon Regional Employers’ Network 
Mr. Yong-Ki Yoon, Executive Director, Korean Bankers’ Association 
Mr. Won-Young Park, Executive Director for HR, Valeo Mando Corporation 
Mr. Keun-Sik Kim, Executive Director for HR, Hyundai Motor Corporation 
Mr. Tae-Jin Kim, Executive Director, SK Corporation 
Mr. Young-Soo Kim, Vice-President, DaCom Corporation 
Mr. Keun-Yeol Yook, Executive Director, LG Chemical Corporation 
Mr. Chang-Ho Yoo, Executive Director, Lotte Hotel 
Mr. Won-Kyu Kim, HR Director, Hanwha Corporation 
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Workers 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) 
Mr. Seong-Tae Kim, Secretary-General, FKTU 
Mr. Jin-Kwhi Noh, Executive-Director, Policy Bureau, FKTU 
Mr. Won-Pyo Kwon, Standing Vice-President, FKTU 
Mr. Min-Woo Lee, Director, Policy Department, FKTU 
Mr. Yong-Deuk Lee, President, Korea Finance Industry Union 
Mr. Sun-Ki Yoo, Director-General, Policy Bureau, Korea Finance Industry Union 
Mr. Deuk-Yun Kim, Director, Policy Department, Korea Finance Industry Union 
Mr. Dae-Ik Jang, President, Federation of Government Invested Entities Unions 
Mr. Won-Hee Lee, President, Postal Office Union 
Mr. Hyun-Jin Jang, Director-General, Public Construction Union Federation 
Mr. Dong-Min Choi, Director-General, Public Service Union Federation 
Mr. Maeng-Keun Oh, Director-General, Policy and Planning Bureau, 
Korea Transport Workers’ Federation 
Mr. Jang-Suk Byun, Secretary-General, Korean Information and 
Communication Workers Federation 
Mr. Dong-Kyun Han, Director, Policy Department, Korean Federation of 
Metal Workers’ Unions 
Mr. Shin-Ho Jang, Director, Policy Department, Korean Taxi Workers’ Federation 
Mr. Kyung-Ho Choi, President, Otis LG union 
Korea Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)6 
Mr. Jae-Woong Lee, Secretary-General, KCTU 
Mr. Tae-Yun Kim, Executive Director, Policy Bureau, KCTU 
Mr. Kang-Woo Park, Director, Policy Department, KCTU 
Ms Hee-Joo Cho, Vice-President, Korean Education Workers Union 
Mr. Seung-Won Lee, President, Korea Public Sector Union Federation 
Mr. Jae-Cheol Kim, President, Railroad Branch of the Korea Public Sector Union Federation 
Mr. Soon-Hwan Baek, President, Korea Metal Workers’ Federation 
Mr. Young-Kyu Yoon, President, Hospital Workers’ Federation 
Ms Sang-Jeong Shim, Secretary-General, Korea Metal Workers’ Union 
Mr. Cheol-Eung Kang, Director, Policy and Planning Department, 
Democratic Chemical Workers’ Federation 
Mr. Yong-Sik Park, Director, Policy Department, Korea Public Sector Union Federation 
 
6 Note: These KCTU representatives were invited to attend the Workshop but did not attend. 
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Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC) 
Mr. Keum-Soo Kim, Chairman, KTC 
Mr. Sun Lee, Vice-Chairman, KTC 
Mr. Hoon Kim, Special Advisor, KTC 
Mr. Hang-Rae Noh, Advisor, KTC 
Researchers and other guests 
Mr. Won-Duck Lee, President of Korea Labor Institute (KLI) 
Mr. Jong-Jeun Ahn, President of Korea Labor Education Institute (KLEI) 
Ms Ha-Jin Jang, President, Korea Women’s Development Institute  
Mr. Young-Ki Choi, Senior Research Fellow, KLI 
Mr. Sang-Hoon Lim, Senior Research Fellow, KLI 
Mr. Sung-Je Jo, Senior Research Fellow, KLI 
Mr. Ki-Don Hwang, Senior Research Fellow, KLEI 
Mr. Cheol-Young Shin, Chairperson, Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice 
Mr. Tae-Hyun Kim, Vice-Director, Korea Labour and Society Institute  
Mr. Eh-Hwan Jung, Professor, Seoul National University of Technology 
Mr. Cheol-Soo Lee, Professor, Ehwa Women’s University 
Mr. Young-Myun Lee, Professor, Dong-Kook University 
Mr. Byung-Hoon Lee, Professor, Joong-Ang University 
Mr. Son-Keun Bae, Professor, Korea University 
 
